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Introduction
It has become a commonplace to compare the depth and scope of globalisation since the 1970s with the earlier era of open international markets from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1913. Globalisation means that goods and factors of production are internationally mobile and that, as a result, there is at least some degree of integration across countries in these markets. A number of recent studies have suggested that rising globalisation since the Second World War in goods and capital ma rkets has brought the developed world back to where it was a century ago (see the studies in Bordo et. al. • Did the same economic variables drive British emigration in the two eras, and if so, how did the magnitude of their effects differ?
• What was the role of immigration policy in the receiving countries and can its effects on the numbers of migrants be identified?
• What combination of economic, demographic and policy variables accounts for the striking de-globalisation of British labour since the 1960s?
The paper deals with these issues in four sections. The next section looks at the overall magnitudes and trends in British emigration. This is followed by a discussion of the evolution of immigration policies in the main receiving countries. The next section examines econometric estimates of the determinants of emigration in the pre-1914 period. Those 2 estimates are then used to predict what might have happened from the 1960s to the 1990s in the absence of policy intervention in the receiving countries. Emigration for this period is then estimated directly to assess the effects of policy. The main conclusion is that most of the fall in British emigration (and indeed much of the turnaround in net UK migration as a whole) was due to immigration policy. In the absence of such policies, emigration of British citizens would have been substantially higher, especially between 1971 and 1991.
Two Eras of Mass Migration
In the 60 years between 1853 and 1913 the passenger statistics record that a total of nearly 13 million British citizens left the UK bound for extra-European ports, 10 million of whom departed after 1870. These were passengers, chiefly travelling steerage, rather than emigrants as such, and there was also a large return flow. 1 Cumulative net passenger movement after 1870 was nearly 6 million, equivalent to 13 percent of the population 1913.
About two three fifths of these emigrants were male, about three fifths were single, and among the adults, more than four fifths were aged between 18 and 45.
The annual flow plotted in Figure 1 shows an upward trend in the total numbers, and characteristic long swings with highs in the decade from 1865, in the 1880s, and in the decade immediately before the First World War. The figure also shows net passenger movements, possibly a better measure of emigration since it nets out return migrants and non-migrant travellers. The absolute numbers are lower but the profile of net migration is very similar to that of gross migration, indicating that fluctuations in the net numbers are driven chiefly by the gross flows rather than by return migration. Although there is an upward trend in the overall number of UK emigrants, there is no obvious long run trend in emigration per thousand of the population. This ranged from lows of less than four per thousand in the late 1870s and the late 1890s per thousand in to highs of around 8 per thousand in the early 1880s and in1910-12. In the 1850s and 1960s a large share of emigrants came from Ireland, then part of the UK, but Irish emigration declined both absolutely and as a share of As Figure 2 shows, the dominant destination among these was the United States, accounting for 62 percent of the four-country gross outflow and for 55 percent of the overall total. Not surprisingly, emigration to the US accounts for much of the year-to-year fluctuations in total emigration observed in Figure 1 . Emigration to Canada was much smaller and followed a pattern of fluctuations somewhat similar to the US up to the turn of the century. Hemisphere immigrants and a preference system that allocated the majority of visas to family-sponsored immigrants, although close relatives were exempted from the quota. Over the following 15 years changes to this system involved introducing a business skills stream and increasing the proportion of immigration subject to the points test (DIMA, 2000) .
New Zealand was the last country to repeat the cycle in immigration policy followed gives more weight to general skills rather than occupations in demand (Winkelmann, 1999).
As a result 65 percent of immigrants to New Zealand in the 1990s were points tested. Like
Australia the minimum threshold points score is adjusted depending on conditions in the labour market.
7 The Numerically Weighted Multi-Factor Assessment System (NUMAS) that was introduced in 1979 has been characterised as a 'halfway house" between the Canadian points system and the Structured Selection Assessment System (SAAS), largely based on interviews, that had existed since 1975. NUMAS came under severe criticism for giving too much weight to English language proficiency and thus undermining the shift towards non-discriminatory immigration policy (Hawkins, 1989, p. 142) . The down-weighting of proficiency in English under the Migrant Assessment System in 1983 aroused even more controversy from those who still favoured a white Australia-see Blainey (1984) .
Explaining UK Emigration 1872-1913
There is a large literature that concentrates on estimating the determinants of migration flows from Europe to the New World in the late nineteenth century. Those studies typically focus on bilateral flows from one origin to one destination or on aggregate emigration from a particular source country or to a particular destination. They typically specify emigration as depending on real wage rates and employment rates at the source and the destination, sometimes including a limited number of other variables. The result for gross emigration of UK citizens appears in Table 1 . Two lags of the dependent variable were found to be significant but lags of other variables, apart from those included in the table, were not found to be important. The stock of previous migrants from the UK at the destination concerned reflects the so called friends and relatives effect that features so prominently in accounts that stress the cost-reducing and uncertainty-reducing effects that migrant networks provide. Here, an addition of one thousand to the migrant stock raises the annual flow of emigrants to that destination by 48 per annum in the short run and by 94 per annum in the long run-a powerful effect consistent with those estimated for aggregate emigration. The share of the UK population aged 20-34 is a proxy for the size of the emigration intensive cohort-those for whom the net present value of migration is largest.
This effect must be multiplied by three to obtain the aggregate effect over the three emigration streams. The coefficient implies that the emigration for this age group would be 9 higher than that for other age groups by 13 per thousand in the short run and by 25 per thousand in the long run.
The log of employment rates overseas and in the UK (lagged one year) have powerful effects with signs that are opposite but have similar magnitudes. These results strongly support the traditions in the literature that emphasises business cycle effects on the timing of migration. In the long run across the three migration streams a one percent increase in the destination employment rate increases the emigration rate by 0.9 per thousand in the long run while a one percent increase in the UK employment rate reduces it by 0.7 per thousand. The real wage ratio has an effect that is proportionately much smaller so that a ten-percent rise in the destination to source wage ratio raises the combined gross emigration rate by 0.9 per thousand.
A number of experiments were undertaken to capture the effects of subsidies for emigrants to Australia and New Zealand in the 1870s and 1880s and again in the years before 1914 by including dummy variables. The only one that was close to significance is for the period 19010-13, reflecting the height of assisted passages to Australia. This is consistent with Pope (1981) who finds a negative effect of passage costs on immigration to Australia after the turn of the century. That effect is somewhat more significant in the second column of the table, which is for emigration from Great Britain (excluding Ireland), a result that makes sense since subsidies were targeted mainly to Britain. In other respects the estimate for Great Britain is similar to that for the UK as a whole, suggesting that British and Irish migration streams were guided by the same forces. 9 The final column is for net UK migration and again the pattern of coefficients is similar. Thus net emigration was driven by very much the same forces as gross emigration.
The effects of the individual variables on the course of emigration can be assessed by decomposing changes over time into the effects of different variables. Table 1 The long run coefficients estimated for the pre-1914 period are used to explain the decline in predicted emigration in terms of the individual variables. As Table 3 shows, between 1966-70 and 1980-4 the share of population aged 20-34 should have been increasing the level of emigration, especially gross emigration. The emigrant stock and the wage ratio had small negative effects while home and foreign employment rates had effects that were almost exactly offsetting. Overall, gross emigration to the four countries is predicted to rise by 2.3 per thousand whereas, in fact, it fell by 1.6 per thousand.
In the period from 1980-4 to 1994-8 both the migrant stock and the share of the UK population aged 20-34 contributed to a predicted fall in gross and net emigration.
Employment rates had a small positive effect because the UK employment rate fell by slightly more than did the average for the destination countries. But the most important factor that reduced predicted emigration was the wage ratio, largely as a result of the sharp and sustained rise in UK real hourly earnings in the early 1990s. Overall between 1966-70 and 1994-8 the prewar coefficients predict most of the decline in emigration but not its timing.
As Figure 5 showed, between 1971 and 1991 both gross and net emigration are massively over predicted. This suggests that immigration policies in the receiving countries were particularly important during those two decades.
Explaining Emigration 1966-98
The model used to explain emigration rates between 1966 and 1998 is similar in spirit to that used for the pre-1914 period. The main difference is the inclusion of a range of dummy variables that are intended to capture the shifts in immigration policies outlined above. In the data for 1964-98 (see Appendix) Australia and New Zealand are separately identified so that the model is estimated over four migration streams for the years 1996-98.
The model is estimated for UK citizens and for the total flow of UK and Commonwealth citizens. The more inclusive definition is arguably closer to that for the pre-1914 period when British and Dominion citizenship s were not distinct. But since the estimates that include Commonwealth citizens are very similar to those for UK citizens alone, only the latter are discussed.
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The results in the first two columns of Table 4 bear some similarities with those estimates for the late nineteenth century reported in Table 1 . The first and second lags of the dependent variable, though somewhat smaller than those estimated earlier, suggest a similar pattern of dynamics. The effect of the stock of previous emigrants on gross emig ration gives a long-run coefficient such that increasing the emigrant stock by a thousand adds a further 33 per year to gross emigration. In the presence of family reunification policies, the stock effect still matters, but the size of this effect is only one third as large as it was in the late nineteenth century. The effect of the share aged 20-34 is also much smaller than it was in the earlier era and the coefficients are much less significant. Overall an increase in the share aged 20-34 increases emigration in the long run by less than a tenth as much as it did before 1914.
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The effects of economic incentives as reflected in the coefficients on the employment rates and the wage ratio are also very much smaller than those in the pre-war estimates. In the long-run a rise in the employment rate across all destinations of one percentage point raises gross emigration by a total of 0.15 per thousand. Although this reflects the fact that immigration targets have often been responsive to employment conditions, the effect is still only about one sixth of the size of that for the late nineteenth century. For the UK employment rate no negative effect could be found in levels, but the change in the UK employment rate does have a modest negative effect on both gross and net emigration.
Finally, the log of the wage ratio produces small and insignificant effects that are negative for gross emigration and positive for net emigration. Thus, in the presence of destination country immigration policies for most of the period, it comes as no surprise to find that the short-and long run effects of economic variables are severely attenuated as compared to a freemigration counterfactual.
Not surprisingly the dummies that represent country-specific policy shifts have Table 3 showed, pressure for emigration from Britain had largely subsided by the early 1990s. And second, the shift towards skills-based immigration policies probably favoured British immigrants on balance over those from other potential source countries.
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In Table 5 the trends in the emigration of UK citizens are decomposed using the long-run coefficients from equations 1 and 2 in Table 4 . In the period from 1966-70 to 1980-4 the negative effects of falling employment rates overseas and the declining migrant stock were partly offset by the falling employment rate in Britain and the rising population share aged 20-34. But the key effects that reduced emigration were the tightening immigration policies, especially in Canada and Australia. These shifts in immigration policy account for 68 percent of the observed fall in gross emig ration and for nearly all of the fall in net emigration. In the period from the early 1980s to 1994-8 the fall in the emigrant stock and the increasing UK employment rate added to the downward trend in emigration while the policy variables evidently had small positive effects.
Over the whole period from 1966-70 to 1994-98 policy changes accounted for two thirds of the fall in the four-country emigration rate of UK citizens, either gross or net. These policy effects also account for about two fifths of the change in the overall balance of net UK emigration across all citizenships and between all countries from 1.36 to -1.24 per to those in the age range 18-29 and does not admit those over the age of 45. 12 Under the New Zealand points system English language proficiency is mandatory condition for skillbased immigration and it does not therefore contribute to the points score. For non-native speakers, minimum proficiency is measured as a score of 5 in each component of the IELTS test (Winklemann, 1999, p. 26 ).
14 thousand of the UK population. Allowing for the indirect effects of policy on the migrant stock would make the contribution of immigration policy larger still. 
Conclusion
